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I. THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE AS A FAILURE OF ORIGINAL INTENT
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to override the
denial of jus soli birthright U.S. citizenship to African Americans in
1
Dred Scott v. Sandford while at the same time excluding from such
birthright citizenship all indigenous people who remained members
of their native tribes. They struggled but ultimately failed to find
language that accomplished these two objectives in coherent fashion.
They sought to limit birthright citizenship to those who could be presumed to have full allegiance to the United States. But use of the “allegiance” language risked echoing feudal doctrines of perpetual allegiance that the American Revolution and American republican
principles had repudiated. The language they ultimately employed—
2
“and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” —instead sought to focus on
whether persons were fully and exclusively under the jurisdiction of
the United States, as persons still living in tribes were not. But all
such tribal members were subject to the ultimate jurisdiction of the
United States, so the effort to exclude them through the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” was a logical failure. The original in3
tent was sustained in Elk v. Wilkins, but without an interpretation that
could render the clause fully coherent—because there is none.
More than two decades ago in Citizenship Without Consent, Peter
Schuck and I argued that the best, if still imperfect, way to bring logical coherence to the Citizenship Clause consonant with its dual original intentions was to draw on the international law writers invoked
by American jurists and legislators when trying to define the status of
the native tribes, particularly Emmerich de Vattel and Jean-Jacques
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Burlamaqui. They tried to render jus soli citizenship consistent with
citizenship based on the consent of persons to mutual political association through contending that parents should be understood to
demand the offer of citizenship to their children as a condition of
their own consent to membership. Vattel had defined the native tribes as dependent nations who were understood to wish to maintain
5
significant, if limited, autonomy. Their members therefore could
not be presumed to seek citizenship for themselves or their children.
Schuck and I believed that this interpretation of the Citizenship
Clause best accorded with the conflicting aims of its Framers (to include African Americans, but exclude Native Americans in tribes),
with theoretical efforts to make birthright citizenship accord with
membership via consent, and with the international law traditions
upon which they drew.
It nonetheless had difficulties. To include African Americans and
children of permanent resident aliens, the Clause had to be interpreted not to require everyone to have citizen parents, so long as the
parents were present on American soil by the consent of the U.S.
Government. That interpretation represented a modification of Vattel’s and (arguably) Burlamaqui’s views (however plausible). And, of
course, our view also meant that the Clause should not be read as
conferring birthright citizenship on the children of aliens never legally permitted into the United States. The choice of their status
would be left to Congress, as was and is true for Native Americans living in tribes, whose citizenship stems from congressional legislation
6
enacted in 1924. Many, including both of us, have found that implication politically troubling, and many arguments have been mounted
against our view. I would prefer to read the Citizenship Clause as
consistently embodying an anti-caste, anti-subordination principle as
Cristina Rodríguez has urged, consistent with interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause that I have long
7
favored. Yet I cannot escape the conclusion that the framers and
ratifiers of that Amendment consciously intended to perpetuate the
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subordination of Native Americans who had not renounced their tribal allegiances, even if they did not intend to subordinate non-white
immigrants. And U.S. policies then permitted both Native Americans
and non-white immigrants to move from their home tribes or nations
without substantive restrictions, so it is at best difficult to say that they
meant to extend to those coming to the United States in violation of
national policies the anti-subordination protection they denied to
members of the native tribes.
There are, to be sure, other arguments for interpreting the Citizenship Clause’s intentions inclusively that have force, even if they do
8
not seem to me entirely convincing. Rather than continue all those
debates, I contend in the next section that one reply has been strengthened by recent developments: arguments for tacit consent to jus
soli citizenship for all.
II. RECENT DEBATES OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENSHIP
A variety of our critics have contended that, regardless of the
phrasing, history, or original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment,
there is no difficulty reconciling birthright citizenship for undocumented aliens with ideals that rest citizenship on consent to mutual
political association. The reality is that the nineteenth century Supreme Court upheld birthright citizenship for children of aliens in
9
U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, and it has been accepted with virtual unanimity
by the American people ever since then, if not before. As a result,
the nation can be said to have effectively consented to a reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment that confers jus soli birthright citizenship
on children of aliens never legally admitted to the United States.
When we wrote in 1985, this argument seemed unconvincing for
two reasons. First, Wong Kim Ark deals explicitly only with children of
legally admitted aliens. The undocumented alien population then
was much smaller and may well not have seemed significant; at any
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rate, the Court gave no attention to the children of such aliens in that
decision or any later one. Acceptance of the Wong Kim Ark precedent
therefore cannot be said to involve explicit acceptance of jus soli citizenship for aliens not legally present in the United States, either by
the Court or the American public.
Second, at the time we first discussed the topic, even many scholars of American constitutional law were unaware that the Fourteenth
Amendment had never been read to provide birthright citizenship to
children born to members of the native tribes. Most we encountered
had not heard of Elk v. Wilkins or assumed it had at some point been
overruled. Given this limited knowledge among constitutional experts, it strained credulity to say that the American people had in any
real sense ever decided that Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship should extend to children of undocumented aliens. Most
Americans, even most highly educated Americans, even most Americans in academia or in law, were blissfully unaware that there might
be any issue about it. There was admittedly lots of unthinking acceptance of the status quo, but that did not seem to us a very meaningful
form of consent.
That situation has now changed, in part because of our book. In
its wake, a number of organizations favoring immigration restriction
have repeatedly advocated either for congressional legislation denying birthright citizenship to children of undocumented aliens, or for
a constitutional amendment to achieve that result, or for both. Beginning in 1993 and continuing in every congressional session thereafter to the present, Representative Elton Gallegly of Simi Valley,
California has been particularly energetic in introducing legislation
to achieve denial of birthright citizenship to illegal alien children by
10
either of these routes, sometimes citing our book. (Both Schuck
and I refused to testify on behalf of these measures.) At the height of
his power after the 1994 election, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich also endorsed these steps and they appeared in the 1996 Republican Party Platform, which read in part: “We support a constitutional amendment or constitutionally-valid legislation declaring that
children born in the United States of parents who are not legally pre-
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sent in the United States or who are not long-term residents are not
11
automatically citizens.”
These proposals continue to be put forth to this day, backed both
by advocacy groups and by many members of Congress. The 109th
Congress saw seven measures introduced, one in the Senate and six
in the House, which would in various ways have restricted birthright
12
citizenship for children of undocumented aliens. In the 110th Congress, one hundred and four Congressmen have co-sponsored the
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2007, which would legislatively interpret
the Fourteenth Amendment not to provide citizenship to those born
to parents not legally present in the United States, beginning after
13
the date of the law’s enactment.
In sum, since the 1990s, the nation’s legislators and one political
party have regularly raised and debated the issue of birthright citizenship for undocumented aliens, with strong advocacy for exclusion.
These efforts have all failed. Indeed, none has come anywhere close
to winning congressional approval or broader popular support. It
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therefore makes much more sense than it did in 1985 to say that
Americans have, through their representatives and their votes for
their representatives, consented to reading the Fourteenth Amendment to provide birthright citizenship to children of all aliens born
on American soil, whether legally present or not (with the continuing
exception of children of ambassadors, in accordance with the legal
fiction that they still reside in their home country). Many critics of
our reading of the Fourteenth Amendment will no doubt persist in
arguing that it was always erroneous for a variety of reasons. But perhaps we can all now agree that, insofar as consent to the prevailing
practice is required for its legitimacy, the case for such consent effectively having been given is now stronger than it once was.
III. THE NEW CHALLENGE TO BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
The academic debate over birthright citizenship has, however, not
ended. Instead, it has recently taken a new and highly significant
turn. In a series of articles culminating in her new book, The Birthright Lottery, Ayelet Shachar (writing sometimes with Ran Hirschl), has
called attention to an undeniable reality: the institution of birthright
citizenship assigns to a small portion of the world’s population a
bundle of valuable resources simply due to their places of birth, while
it consigns literally billions of others to far harsher circumstances due
14
to their places of birth. For Shachar, it is not the incompatibility of
birthright citizenship with democratic principles of consensual membership that is its most disturbing feature. It is rather its incompatibility with egalitarian versions of social justice. Her argument has
force. In a new century marked by rising political and social movements seeking to promote greater global justice and a range of cosmopolitan humanitarian concerns, the domestically inclusive and
egalitarian features of birthright citizenship increasingly seem less
striking than the externally exclusionary and inegalitarian consequences of the policy.
Even so, birthright citizenship is inclusive and egalitarian for those
residing on the territory of a given political community; and it is hard
to envision an arrangement for assigning civic memberships that
would be pronouncedly more egalitarian. Shachar and Hirschl have
argued for some system of global redistribution of resources to compensate for the unearned advantages of birth into more prosperous
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and peaceful societies, but they recognize that no such proposals are
15
likely to be politically feasible in the foreseeable future. Just as it is
plausible to attribute to parents the desire to make their citizenships
available to their children, we can also expect many parents to feel
that they have contributed to the relative well-being of their communities and that they are therefore entitled to pass those advantages on
to their children—even if the advantages conferred seem clearly to
outrun anything the parents have contributed to those societies.
But the main point of Shachar’s work is to spark a debate over
whether we can defensibly maintain the global status quo in regard to
birthright citizenship or whether we should seek alternative arrangements, either for conferring civic memberships or for ameliorating
their unequal consequences or some combination of both. The results of such debate cannot be foreseen. But if the prior debate over
the desirability of birthright citizenship for undocumented aliens that
was partly sparked by Citizenship Without Consent is any evidence,
bringing the issues Shachar is raising into public discussion may well
prove to have some desirable consequences, even if no radical change
in the status quo ensues. At a minimum, the experience of the modern debate over birthright citizenship in the United States suggests
that we should not be too fearful of contributing controversial ideas
to democratic contestation and processes of self-governance.
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